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The issues involved in embryo donation/adoption are vast and 
complex on scientific, ethical, and political levels.  What an 
embryo1
 
       †   Elizabeth Swire Falker, Esq., (The Stork Lawyer®) is an attorney practicing 
in the areas of third-party assisted reproduction and adoption.  The author would 
like to thank Danielle Bifulci Kocal, Esq., for her editorial assistance in the 
preparation of this article, and Samantha Hill and Sarah Thomas for their 
assistance with the research of this article. 
 1. Notwithstanding later discussion in this article regarding applicable 
terminology and discussion regarding the definition of an embryo, for purposes of 
clarity and ease of reference, the term embryo will be used herein to refer to any 
fertilized human ova that has not been transferred to the uterus of a woman 
and/or that has not obtained a level of cellular differentiation presented by 
evidence of a primitive streak.  See infra Part III for a discussion of stages of 
embryonic development. 
 is and how it should be treated are hotly debated issues at 
the forefront of reproductive science and the law.  The opinions 
are varied and diametric, from those who believe embryos are 
solely cellular matter and should be treated as such, making them 
eligible for “donation” such as one would donate a kidney or a 
1
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liver, to those who believe each and every embryo is a living, 
sentient being, and should therefore only be eligible for 
“adoption.”  Indeed, the debate is inflammatory and extremist; for 
example, one religious authority, the Donum Vitae, has pronounced 
that, notwithstanding the fact that it considers frozen embryos to 
be human beings that should be afforded all rights and protections 
accordant therewith, frozen embryos must be thawed and allowed 
to die because they were created in an unnatural manner through 
in vitro fertilization (IVF).2
This article will analyze the legal and statutory models for the 
disposition of cryopreserved embryos to a third party for purposes 
of family building.  Part I will present an overview of the debate and 
its importance in the current legal, bioethical, and political 
climate.
  Indeed, arguments such as the one set 
forth by the Donum Vitae perhaps best encapsulate how divisive the 
nature of the debate surrounding the disposition of frozen embryos 
can get. 
3  Part II will present an overview of the “two” models for 
disposition, donation and adoption, and will demonstrate that 
other than through the different use of terminology, there is no 
meaningful difference in the current methodology for disposing of 
frozen embryos to third parties for purposes of family building.4
Thus, Part III will seek to define the term “embryo” by 
analyzing the legal and scientific definitions afforded embryos to 
date, and will discuss how state and federal law impact the 
  
Notwithstanding the fact, however, that from a practical standpoint 
there may be no “real” distinction between embryo donation and 
adoption, these contradictory paradigms and the concomitant 
misapplication of terminology must be addressed and resolved if 
the disposition of frozen embryos is going to provide a real and 
substantial means for building new families in the future. 
 
 2. E.g., Karin A. Moore, Embryo Adoption: The Legal and Moral Challenges, 1 U. 
ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 100, 117–19 (discussing the Donum Vitae’s position 
on frozen embryos and in vitro fertilization, noting that “[w]hen the act of embryo 
adoption is characterized as a wonderful gift to an infertile couple instead of 
making the best possible situation out of an irresponsible moral choice, it 
undermines the goal of stopping frozen embryos from being created in the first 
place . . . .” and that “[t]hose opposing embryo adoption [in the right-to-life 
Catholic community] believe the problem must be attacked going forward, and 
that those lives already hanging in the frozen abyss must be allowed to die for the 
greater good of an unequivocal stand against the practice of IVF.”). 
 3. See infra Part I. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
2
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definition of an embryo.5  It will then propose a definition for the 
term “embryo” that is consistent with existing jurisprudence and 
science and will also provide ongoing stability for the disposition of 
cryopreserved embryos for purposes of conception given the 
current legal and constitutional environment.6  Part III will further 
discuss how the definition of an embryo has the potential to 
undermine existing procreative freedoms; and how the definition 
of an embryo has been used intentionally in an effort to create a 
backdoor approach to weaken procreative freedoms recognized in 
Roe v. Wade7 and its progeny.8
Part IV of this article will examine existing jurisprudential 
theories regarding the termination of parental rights and how state 
adoption laws and public policies impact an embryo adoption.
 
9  
Finally, Part V will propose a model for the disposition of 
cryopreserved embryos which is consistent both with existing legal 
precedent as well as medical, ethical and normative ideas regarding 
the disposition and donation of cellular matter and gametes.10
I. THE DEBATE OVER THE DISPOSITION OF CRYOPRESERVED 
EMBRYOS FOR FAMILY BUILDING 
  This 
article argues that any application of the traditional adoption 
model to the disposition of cryopreserved embryos is not only 
inconsistent with the overwhelming body of U.S. legal 
jurisprudence, but also that, from a normative and ethical 
standpoint, such a paradigm also undermines and confuses the well 
established protected interests of genetic/gestating birth parents.  
In addition, such a paradigm propounds the fears and 
vulnerabilities of the infertile population, whether due to medical 
or social factors. 
It is incongruous and iconoclastic that, as science hurdles 
humanity forward into uncharted and once incomprehensible 
 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. It is the intent of this article to better define an embryo solely in the 
context of the disposition of frozen embryos to third parties to create new family 
units and to analyze the conflicting approaches taken by courts, legislatures, and 
practitioners.  This article does not attempt to address substantial moral questions 
surrounding whether embryos are human beings or when life begins. 
 7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 8. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994); Webster v. 
Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See infra Part V. 
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technologies involving the ability to create life and families, the law, 
legal scholars, and bioethicists struggle to keep pace and to define 
that life and those families.11  Reproductive technologies have 
served not only to offer new and faster means of creating families 
for those who not twenty-five years ago might have remained 
childless but have also simultaneously created one of the most 
divisive and misunderstood discussions regarding the implications 
and implementation of that technology.  Had political invective not 
taken such a large and overwhelming role in the early discussions 
regarding the application of these new technologies, reasoned 
minds and appropriate debate might have avoided much of the 
current controversy regarding the disposition of cryopreserved 
embryos.12
Regardless of political debate (or lack thereof), however, 
reproductive technology has advanced to the point where it is now 
possible for a person or couple to conceive a child that lacks any 
genetic connection to either or both of them and that is carried in 
utero by neither of them.
 
13  Through the combination of egg and 
sperm donation and surrogacy, together with the improvement of 
medical protocols for achieving controlled ovarian 
hyperstimulation and the culture medium used to support the 
fertilized ovum, the medically and/or socially infertile American 
has more options for parenthood and greater chances of success 
than ever before.  In the process, the infertile get to experience 
pregnancy and express control over the uterine environment of 
their growing offspring.14
 
 11. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 178 (N.Y. 1998) (“[A]s science races 
ahead, it leaves in its trail mind-numbing ethical and legal questions.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 12. European and Scandinavian countries debated and discussed these issues 
throughout the evolution of the technologies being discussed herein, whereas the 
response in the United States was to shut down funding for, and thus end, any 
debate regarding scientific advances in fields like stem cell research.  See, e.g., 
Susan L. Crockin, The “Embryo” Wars: At the Epicenter of Science, Law, Religion and 
Politics, 39 FAM. L.Q. 599, 620–24 (2005) [hereinafter Crockin, The Embryo Wars]. 
 13. Through the use of both an egg and sperm donor and a gestational 
carrier, a recipient, or intended parent may have a child that lacks any genetic 
connection with him or her, and may do so without going through an adoption 
process.  See, e.g., Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Collaborative Reproduction and Rethinking 
Parentage, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 43, 47–50 (2008); see also CHARLES P. 
KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A 
LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 1–25 (2006) [hereinafter 
Kindregan & McBrien, Assisted Reproductive Technology]. 
 
 14. E.g., Brandon S. Mercer, Embryo Adoption: Where are the Laws?, 26 J. JUV. L. 
4
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As a well recognized byproduct of the success of the science of 
in vitro fertilization, there now are an estimated 400,000 
cryopreserved embryos stored in fertility clinics in the United States 
today.15  These are the embryos that remain after a couple or 
individual has successfully undergone IVF, donor IVF, or a 
gestational carrier arrangement (to name only a few of the possible 
combinations for achieving parenthood utilizing third party 
assisted reproduction).  To date, the largest discussion of what to 
do with these cryopreserved embryos has centered—at least in case 
law—over disputes arising during divorce proceedings16 or after the 
death of one of the genetic parents.17  While not consistently 
resolved among U.S. courts, there is a sufficient body of case law in 
the United States to help couples address, ahead of time, issues 
regarding disposition of frozen embryos upon divorce or regarding 
children conceived posthumously.18  The existing body of case law 
also can help them predict the outcome of any potential dispute 
arising under such circumstances (divorce or death).19  The 
discussion, however, over how to dispose of cryopreserved embryos 
for a third party’s family building—embryo donation or adoption—
is far from being as “settled” as is the law regarding custody or 
inheritance disputes.20
 
73, 74 (2006). 
 
 15. Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 609 (discussing the number of 
embryos in frozen storage); see also David I. Hoffman et al., Cryopreserved Embryos in 
the United States and Their Availability for Research, 79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1063, 
1063–64 (2003) (stating that the exact number of stored embryos is not known 
and ranges from tens of thousands to several hundred thousand).  Indeed, as of 
the date of this writing, the figure cited herein may well be higher as there have 
been thousands of additional cycles of in vitro fertilization completed since the 
statistics were first published, thereby raising the number of embryos 
cryopreserved for future use. 
 16. E.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); 
In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 
1051 (Mass. 2000);  J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 174;  
In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Davis v. Davis, 842 
S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); In re Marriage of Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002). 
 17. E.g., Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 18. See cases cited supra notes 16–17. 
 19. See cases cited supra notes 16–17. 
 20. See, e.g., Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12; Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. 
& Maureen McBrien, Embryo Donation: Unresolved Legal issues in the Transfer of 
Surplus Cryopreserved Embryos, 49 VILL. L. REV. 169 (2004) [hereinafter Kindregan & 
McBrien, Embryo Donation]; Jessica L. Lambert, Developing a Legal Framework for 
Resolving Disputes Between “Adoptive Parents” of Frozen Embryos: A Comparison to 
Resolutions of Divorce Disputes Between Progenitors, 49 B.C. L. REV. 529 (2008); Mercer, 
supra note 14; Ann Marie Noonan, The Uncertainty of Embryo Disposition Law: How 
5
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The argument over the best and most appropriate means for 
disposing of these embryos encompasses complex discussions over 
stem cell research, human cloning, and the rights of medically and 
socially infertile Americans to build their families.21  This article 
does not attempt—nor does it need to, given the current laws 
regarding research into stem cells or human cloning—to address 
the moral, legal, or medical issues involved in using these frozen 
embryos to further scientific research.22  Rather, this article focuses 
on a rarely discussed23 and poorly understood distinction regarding 
the disposition of these cryopreserved embryos solely for purposes 
of family building—namely, an inherent conflict and confusion 
over whether frozen embryos can and should be “donated” to 
prospective parents or placed with those parents for purposes of 
“adoption.”24
At the heart of this poorly understood controversy lie 
questions involving some of the most impassioned and justifiably 




First and perhaps foremost, the issue of whether these embryos 
can or should be donated to or adopted by the prospective parents 
involves overarching notions of when life begins.
  The disposition of frozen embryos to non-
genetically related parents for purposes of creating another family 
implicates three critical debates which are inconsistently addressed 
among state legislatures, federal and state jurists, legal scholars, bio-
ethicists, and the United States Congress. 
27
 
Alterations to Roe Could Change Everything, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 485 (2007). 
  If life begins at 
 21. See, e.g., Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12. 
 22. E.g., id. 
 23. A brief survey of literature and case law reveals more argument on how to 
dispose of cryopreserved embryos in the event of death or divorce than for 
purposes of family building.  See, e.g., supra notes 16–17, 20. 
 24. Indeed, the common interchangeable use of both terms (donation and 
adoption) to describe two different legal processes for accomplishing the same 
goal—the creation of a new family unit—serves to underscore how poorly 
understood and analyzed this issue has become. 
 25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 26. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994); Webster v. Reprod. 
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 27. See, e.g., Susan L. Crockin, “What is an Embryo?”: A Legal Perspective, 36 
CONN L. REV. 1177 (2004) [hereinafter Crockin, “What is an Embryo?”]; Kelly J. 
Hollowell, Defining a Person Under the Fourteenth Amendment: A Constitutionally and 
Scientifically Based Analysis, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 67 (2002); Ann A. Kiessling, What 
is an Embryo?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1051 (2004); Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo 
Donation, supra note 20; Robert L. Stenger, Embryos, Fetuses and Babies: Treated as 
Persons and Treated With Respect, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 33 (2006). 
6
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fertilization, some commentators argue that an adoption model 
must be utilized for disposition of these embryos to create a new 
family.28  Significant practical roadblocks exist, however, to the 
application of an adoption model, as the vast majority of states do 
not permit the pre-birth termination of parental rights.29  If, 
instead, these frozen embryos are not to be afforded protection 
either as “potential life”30 or as “juridical persons,”31 other 
commentators argue that the donation model becomes more 
persuasive and practical, enabling frozen embryos to be donated to 
third parties without concerns regarding the pre-birth termination 
of parental rights.32
It is important to note that so confusing and complicated is 
this determination that even scientists do not always agree on or 
use the same terminology when referring to fertilized human 
eggs.
  Thus, the first and most critical question 
presented is: what legal status can or should be attributed to a 
fertilized human ovum that has been cryogenically preserved? 
33  The terms zygote, pre-embryo, preembyro, embryo, among 
others, have all been used to describe what is typically understood 
by the layman as an embryo that possesses the capability of growing 
into a fetus and later a newborn baby.  Clarification at both the 
scientific and legal levels is essential to understanding the next two 
questions encompassed by this debate.34
 
 28. E.g., Moore, supra note 
 
2; Mercer, supra note 14. 
 29. See infra Part IV. 
 30. E.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (discussing 
treatment and status of embryos under the law and holding that cryopreserved 
embryos occupy an “interim category” between that of persons and property and 
thus should be afforded “special respect” due to their “potential for human life.”). 
 31. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:123–33 (2008) (stating that an in vitro fertilized 
human ovum is a juridical and biological person under Louisiana law). 
 32. See Olga Batsedis, Embryo Adoption: A Science Fiction of an Alternative to 
Traditional Adoption?, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 565 (2003); Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra 
note 12; Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo Donation, supra note 20; Stenger, supra note 
27. 
 33. See, e.g., Crockin, “What is An Embryo?”, supra note 27, at 1177–78 
(describing cellular stages and differentiation of the preembryo and application of 
terminology thereto); Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592–94 (discussing scientific 
testimony regarding the stages of embryonic development and application of 
appropriate terminology thereto); Howard W. Jones, Jr. & Lucinda Veeck, What is 
an Embryo?, 77 FERTILITY & STERILITY 658, 659 (2002). 
 34. For purposes of clarity, although not ignoring the substantial debate over 
what proper term should be utilized when describing and discussing a fertilized 
human ovum, see supra note 1, for simplicity the author has chosen to use the term 
embryo when referring to the cryopreserved embryos that are the subject of the 
discussion set forth herein. 
7
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Depending on how one defines these cryopreserved embryos 
for legal purposes, the next question revolves around what legal 
rights, if any, they may have.  Unfortunately, state legislatures and 
jurists have accepted differing interpretations of those legal rights 
and have created divergent and inconsistent laws regarding the 
rights to be granted these frozen embryos.  This has created 
conflicting and contradictory models for courts, lawyers, and 
medical professionals to attempt to follow when seeking to create a 
new family through the disposition of cryopreserved embryos.  
Serving to complicate and escalate the debate even further are the 
implications these contradictory schemes present when considered 
in light of the United States Supreme Court’s determination that 
women have a degree of procreative autonomy that permits them 
to terminate an otherwise viable pregnancy within certain delicately 
balanced protections and circumstances.35  To wit, a woman may 
not terminate her pregnancy if the fetus she is carrying has reached 
a degree of gestational development since it is considered to be a 
viable life independent of the womb and woman in which it has 
been growing.36  The determination of what these frozen embryos 
are or should be considered from a scientific and/or legal 
standpoint, and the existing body of legal jurisprudence that seeks 
to inform or enable the process of creating a new family unit 
through the disposition of frozen embryos, implicates a woman’s 
ability to terminate her pregnancy as provided by Roe v. Wade and 
its progeny.37
Indeed, efforts by the Louisiana legislature, which has defined 
a frozen embryo to be a juridical person who must be placed for 
adoption, arguably attempt to circumvent a woman’s right to 





 35. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994); Webster v. Reprod. 
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
  The debate over Roe v. Wade and the inherent fragility 
 36. Commentators have noted that as science changes the time at which a 
fetus is viable outside the uterus of a woman, the protections afforded by Roe are 
reduced.  See Hollowell, supra note 27, at 85. 
 37. Insofar as the definition of an embryo as a person could be deemed to be 
placing undue burdens or obstacles in the path to abortion, it is arguably an 
unconstitutional definition.  E.g., Casey, 510 U.S. at 1309; Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602 
(noting that the gamete provider and/or the embryo’s rights when compared to 
the state’s interest in protecting a non viable fetus is not sufficiently compelling to 
allow it to interfere with a person’s procreational autonomy and therefore the 
state’s interest in a lesser developed embryo cannot be paramount). 
 38. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2008). 
8
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of the decision in the current political climate cannot be 
overlooked as part of the discussion over the means by which 
cryopreserved embryos can or may be used to create a family, as the 
legal protection afforded embryos either drives or diffuses much of 
pro-life debate. 
Thus, the definition given to embryos determines, for 
purposes of legal debate, two paradigms or methods for disposing 
of frozen embryos to recipient families who wish to procreate using 
the frozen embryos.  On one end of the spectrum are the pro-life 
proponents of embryo adoption who advance the definition of an 
embryo as a person and argue that only an adoption model serves 
the best interests of the child in the creation of a new family unit.39  
According to these theorists, in order to protect the unborn 
embryo, the recipient or prospective adoptive parents should go 
through a traditional adoption process including obtaining a home 
study40 and child abuse and criminal background clearances prior 
to the thawing and transfer of the frozen embryo to the prospective 
adoptive mother’s uterus.  On the other end of the debate are 
those commentators and jurists who believe embryos should be 
deemed to be “cellular matter” and thus are the legal “property” of 
the genetic parents to be disposed of as they would dispose of other 
property under the law, by contract.41  These theorists posit that 
frozen embryos and parental rights should be transferred by 
contract, as is commonly done for the donation of human eggs to 
recipient parents.42
In the middle are those who believe embryos should be 
afforded special status and some form of interim protection 
because of their unique capability to give rise to new human life.
 
43  
In the seminal case of Davis v. Davis,44
 
 39. See infra text accompanying notes 
 the court held that embryos 
should be afforded a special or interim status under the law due to 
their potential for life.  It is unclear how the special or interim 
status afforded embryos by the Davis court impacts the disposition 
of a frozen embryo to third parties, except to note that if a 
68–71. 
 40. See ELIZABETH SWIRE FALKER, THE ULTIMATE INSIDER’S GUIDE TO ADOPTION: 
EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION 
(Warner 2006) (chapter three discussing the home study process). 
 41. See, e.g., Batsedis, supra note 32, at 567; Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo 
Donation, supra note 20, at 185–88; Stenger, supra note 27, at 59. 
 42. E.g., Batsedis, supra note 32, at 567; Stenger, supra note 27, at 59. 
 43. E.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
 44. Id. 
9
Falker: The Disposition of Cryopreserved Embryos: Why Embryo Adoption Is
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
  
498 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:2 
donation/contract model is applied, the Davis standard arguably 
would provide the genetic parents the right to revoke consent up 
until the time of the embryo transfer procedure, if not later, based 
on the constitutional protection that one cannot be forced to 
procreate against one’s will.45
The definition of an embryo
  The interim “special status” may 
further implicate Roe v. Wade in that it may interfere with a 
woman’s right to exercise procreative freedom. 
46
Importantly however, when the actual manner in which frozen 
embryos are currently being provided to recipient parents is 
examined, it becomes clear that much of the debate over embryo 
donation and embryo adoption is semantic.  That is, current 
practice even among embryo adoption agencies is to follow a 
contractual or donation model for transferring parental rights of 
the unborn frozen embryo to the recipient parents.
 under the law thus clearly 
defines the means by which frozen embryos can be used by third 
parties for purposes of conception.  If an embryo is a person, then 
arguably the best interests standard and a traditional adoption 
model should apply.  In contrast, if the embryo is property, then 
the contractual donation of the embryo to a third party is 
permissible and should be binding.  Thus, the debate over the 
terms “embryo adoption” and “embryo donation” has arisen largely 
due to the lack of consistency being applied to the definition of 
embryo from a legal standpoint. 
47
II. THE “TYPICAL” EMBRYO ADOPTION/DONATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
Upon close inspection it is clear that the concept of embryo 
adoption/donation is largely a semantic distinction.  For example, 
Snowflakes Adoption Agency in Fullerton, California, which is one 
 
 45. Id. at 592; see also Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 613 (noting 
that the non-forced procreation line of cases indicate that embryo donation 
contracts would be subject to challenge up until the time of transfer if following 
the “special status” standard for defining an embryo). 
 46. It should be noted that the discussion set forth herein is limited to 
whether an embryo should be deemed a person under the law and not to the 
larger ethical question of whether an embryo is a life form or a human life.  See 
Stenger, supra note 27, at 65–67. 
 47. E.g., Batsedis, supra note 32; see also Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 
12, at 611 (noting that “[m]ost who promote the ‘adoption’ terminology 
acknowledge that they are not referring to adoption in a legal sense, and no court 
procedure is involved as in legal adoption.”). 
10
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of the most recognized “embryo adoption agencies” nationwide, 
does not follow the traditional adoption model when making an 
embryo adoption plan.48  Snowflakes operates in the state of 
California where there are no regulations governing embryo 
adoption.49  Accordingly, when making an embryo available for 
adoption to recipient parents, Snowflakes uses a contract model to 
govern the rights and responsibilities of the parties involved in its 
embryo adoptions.50  Snowflakes calls its contract an “adoption 
agreement,” and it relinquishes the rights of the genetic parents 
over the embryos.51  Snowflakes does not require the participants to 
its embryo adoptions to execute a surrender or relinquishment of 
parental rights under California law post-birth, instead relying on 
its adoption agreement to terminate the rights of the genetic 
parents pre-birth.52  This contract further provides that the embryo, 
if live born, will take the name of the adoptive parents and have 
inheritance rights only through the adoptive parents.53
Additionally, in contrast to a traditional domestic newborn 
adoption, in a Snowflake embryo adoption, the genetic parents 
cannot change their minds.
 
54  Before the embryos are provided to 
the adoptive parents for purposes of undergoing an embryo 
transfer procedure, the genetic parent must sign a legal document 
terminating their “ownership rights” to the embryos.55  Snowflakes 
gives the genetic parents three days to change their mind after 
execution of the adoption agreement.56  Once the embryos have 
been transferred to the uterus of the recipient mother, the genetic 
parents no longer have any legal rights or responsibilities with 
respect to the transferred embryo(s).57  In the event there is a 
dispute regarding the embryo adoption, the adoption agreement 
provides further that “this is a property exchange in the case that 
this goes before a court of law.”58
 
 48. Batsedis, supra note 
  Thus, in its own embryo adoption 
agreement, Snowflakes itself acknowledges that it is not conducting 
32, at 570. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. n.92. 
 54. Id. at 570. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (citing Nightlight Christian Adoptions, http://www.nightlight.org/ 
snowflakefaqs.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2008)). 
 57. See id. 
 58. Batsedis, supra note 32, at 571, n.100. 
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an adoption but rather is engaging in a “transaction involving 
property, not persons.”59
Similarly, Adoptions From The Heart, a well established 
adoption agency located on the east coast of the United States, 
acknowledges that its “Embryo Placement Program” involves the 
application of contract law and does not involve traditional 
principles of adoption.
 
60  In its promotional brochures entitled 
“Heartbeats: Embryo Donation Services, Donors: Give the Gift of 
Family” and “Recipient Families: Experience the Miracle of 
Childbirth,”61
[A] contract is signed and notarized by the donating 
couple authorizing the embryo donation.  Once this 
informed consent has been signed, the donors have no 
legal claim to either the embryos or any children who may 
be born as a result of the donation, nor do they hold any 
responsibility for the embryos or any future children who 
may be born as a result of the donation.
 Adoptions From The Heart makes it clear that in its 
program for the disposition of cryopreserved embryos to third 
parties for purposes of their conception, the parties will be 
entering into a contract and not an adoption: 
62
[E]mbryo donation is not considered an adoption even 
though many agencies call it Embryo Adoption.  Embryo 
donation is governed by contract law, not adoption law 
and all federal, state and local laws may apply.  In 
addition, regulations by the US Food and Drug 
Administration related to human tissue donation are 
applicable.
 
The brochure for donating parents goes on to point out that: 
63
Thus, while commentators have opined and contributed to the 
controversy surrounding the application of the adoption model to 
 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Adoptions trom the Heart, Heartbeats: Embryo Placement Program, 
http://adoptionsfromthehear1-px.rtrk.com/heartbeats/index.html (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2008). 
 61. HEARTBEATS: EMBRYO DONATION SERVS., DONORS GIVE THE GIFT OF FAMILY 
(Adoptions from the Heart 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter HEARTBEATS – 
DONORS]; see also HEARTBEATS: EMBRYO DONATION SERVS., RECIPIENT FAMILIES: 
EXPERIENCE THE MIRACLE OF CHILDBIRTH (Adoptions from the Heart 2008) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter HEARTBEATS – FAMILIES].  The Heartbeats embryo 
donation program is administered and run by Adoptions from the Heart, a 
licensed adoption agency in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, 
Virginia, and West Virginia. 
 62. HEARTBEATS – FAMILIES, supra note 61. 
 63. HEARTBEATS – DONORS, supra note 61. 
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the disposition of cryopreserved embryos for purposes of creating a 
new family unit, it is clear that the practical application and 
administration of this means of family building is predominantly 
being conducted based on principles of contract and property 
law.64  While Snowflakes may require its recipient families to 
undergo an adoption home study and a child abuse clearance, as is 
typical in a domestic adoption, it does not apply state adoption laws 
to the process.  As noted above, Adoptions From The Heart clearly 
states that “embryo donation is not considered an adoption even 
though many agencies call it Embryo Adoption.”65
[L]ive Your Dream.  Experience the joy of pregnancy and 
give birth to your adopted child through embryo 
adoption.
 
Indeed, it would appear that this debate may largely arise over 
misapplication of terminology or the intentional confusion (or 
obfuscation) of terms by pro-life proponents.  In one advertisement 
placed by Nightlight Christian Adoptions (Snowflakes) in support 
of a campaign to raise awareness of embryo adoption as a means 
for building families, it is stated: 
66
As will be discussed in greater detail in Part IV, it is impossible 
under state law to adopt a child to whom you have given birth.  In 
most states, well established common law presumptions provide 
that a woman who gives birth to a child will be deemed the legal 
and natural mother of that child.
 
67
Additionally, in more than one law review article reviewed by 
the author, terms such as adoption and donation, and donee and 
parent, were used interchangeably with no understanding of the 
distinction or the need for a distinction between the terms.
  It is thus impossible for a 
woman to adopt a child she has given birth to, as the law already 
recognizes her to be the mother of that child.  It is thus 
oxymoronic and nonsensical to think that one can give birth to 
their own adopted child as this advertisement asserts.   
68
 
 64. See, e.g., id. 
  
Whether intentional or not, the failure of any legal commentator to 
 65. HEARTBEATS – DONORS, supra note 61. 
 66.  Nightlight Christian Adoptions, Embryo Adoption Awareness Advertisement:  
“Live Your Dream,” ADOPTIVE FAMILIES MAGAZINE, Feb. 2009 (advertisement placed 
in the inside front cover, with support from grant #1EAAPA081009-01-00 from the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, promotes uses the language 
“embryo adoption”) (on file with author). 
 67.  Infra p. 512 and note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
 68. See generally Moore, supra note 2. 
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draw any distinctions between adoption and donation with respect 
to the disposition of frozen embryos to third parties for purposes of 
their conception is instructive.  In a Christian response to the 
growing trend of embryo adoption/donation, one commentator 
repeatedly used the terms adoption and donation interchangeably 
when arguing that: 
[E]mbryo adoption is the pro-life community’s attempt to 
counteract a growing disrespect for life by infusing a sense 
of humanity into the human embryo.  Even if this 
situation were not morally contestable, given their 
underlying goal, supporters of embryo adoption need to be 
working to pass legislation that will legitimize the practice 
of embryo adoption in the courts.  Though disputed cases 
have not yet touched on this area, disputed embryos 
between donating parties have consistently been destroyed 
when one party objects to previously consented use.  The 
current case law would suggest there is no respect for the 
life of the embryo in today’s courts.69
Regardless of whether the distinction between embryo 
adoption and embryo donation is semantic, clarification of the 
terms and the laws as they apply to this process is necessary in order 
to make embryo donation/adoption a continued means of family 
building and in order to preserve the procreational autonomy as 
outlined in Roe and its progeny, which may well be at risk.
 
70  In fact, 
as two commentators, Charles Kindregan and Maureen McBrien, 
have pointed out, “The longer the process is called embryo 
adoption, and the more common the phrase becomes, the more 
society may view embryos as persons entitled to legal protection.  
This view would challenge the basic premise of the right to choose 
abortion without state interference.”71
 
 69. Id. at 121 (emphasis added). 
 70. See Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo Donation, supra note 20, at 175 
(describing that terminology being used is inconsistent and that even if “[v]iewed 
as a mere cosmetic change, the use of these terms will not affect the reality of what 
is happening, but could impact public acceptance or rejection of the 
procedure.”). 
 71. Id. at 188–89. 
  Thus, these contradictory 
paradigms and the concomitant misapplication of terminology 
must be addressed and resolved if the disposition of frozen 
embryos to genetically unrelated third parties is going to provide a 
real and substantial means for building new families in the future. 
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III.  DEFINING THE TERM EMBRYO 
Scientists and legal scholars alike have been arguing for several 
years that a better definition of the term “embryo” is necessary to 
provide clarity for ongoing scientific research into stem cell lines 
and human cloning, and for clear resolution of legal disputes 
regarding frozen embryos.72  Focusing, for purposes of this article, 
solely on the legal definition to be attributed to the term “embryo,” 
cases and statutes have presented conflicting definitions of what 
constitutes an embryo.73  Indeed, more than one commentator has 
noted that the single term “embryo” is inadequate to address the 
myriad of issues raised from the creation of embryos through 
assisted reproductive technologies.74
It is well established that a fertilized human egg undergoes a 
dramatic evolution from the time it is first fertilized, through the 
process of implantation in the uterine wall to the growth and 
development of a fetus, and ultimately the birth of a child.
  This article will not attempt to 
restate the overwhelming number of publications that have 
analyzed this issue and/or the significance of those arguments with 
respect to stem cell research.  Rather, it will attempt to provide an 
overview of the definitions presented in legal comments and cases, 
and propose a working definition that best fits within the existing 
constitutional framework. 
75  Of 
note is the significant distinction to be made between the pre-
implantation embryo (sometimes referred to as a pre-embryo 
among other terms) and the post-implantation embryo.  This 
distinction is important because of the developmental milestones 
that take place both prior to and after implantation of the 
embryo.76
 
 72. See, e.g., Crockin, “What is an Embryo?”, supra note 
  The events of the first few days of the fertilized egg’s 
existence are characteristic of rapid change and a high rate of 
attrition, or death, among the fertilized eggs.  This “preembryonic” 
period has been characterized as turbulent, with conservative 
estimates of at least two-thirds of all in vitro fertilized eggs having 
abnormalities resulting in the arrest in the development of the 
27, at 1177–81; 
Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo Donation, supra note 20, at 175; Jones & Veeck, supra 
note 33, at 659. 
 73. See Kiessling, supra note 27, at 1067–72. 
 74. Id. at 1092. 
 75. See, e.g., Jones & Veeck, supra note 33, at 658–59; Kiessling, supra note 27, 
at 1052; Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992). 
 76. Jones & Veeck, supra note 33, at 658. 
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embryo.77  During this early time, the first few days after 
fertilization, identical twinning may occur.78  Until the 
development of the “primitive streak” at or about fourteen days 
post fertilization, there is no guarantee that a single individual will 
ultimately result from the fertilized ovum.79  “The primitive streak 
guarantees biological individuation and terminates the preembryonic 
period.”80  The subsequent few days and weeks of the “embryonic 
period” are marked by the appearance of fundamental tissues and 
organs; at or around eight weeks post fertilization the embryo 
transitions into the fetal period.81  Just prior to the commencement 
of the fetal period, a heartbeat may be detected on ultrasound, 
thus distinguishing a “chemical” pregnancy from a “clinical” 
pregnancy.82  Thus, scientists have identified three distinct phases 
of development: the fertilized egg to the preembryo, the 
preembryo to the embryo, and the embryo to the fetus.83  Scientists 
further argue that there is quite simply no “embryo” before the 
primitive streak forms and that terms “preembryo” and “embryo” 
are distinctly and biologically different stages of development.84
Furthermore, two aspects of these developmental periods 
mark significant changes in the likelihood that the embryo or fetus 
will result in a live birth.  The first occurs during the preembryonic 
period when the preembryo achieves a level of cellular 
development known as the blastocyst stage.  In the in vitro 
fertilization community, preembryos that reach blastocyst 
development are considered more likely to result in a pregnancy 




 77. Id. at 659. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See, e.g., ELIZABETH SWIRE FALKER, THE INFERTILITY SURVIVAL HANDBOOK: 
EVERYTHING YOU NEVER THOUGHT YOU’D NEED TO KNOW 50 (2004).  A chemical 
pregnancy is a pregnancy established by the presence of human chorionic 
gonadotropin (HcG) in the blood or urine of the mother.  A significant number 
of chemical pregnancies spontaneously abort, sometimes even before the 
pregnancy has been detected.  A clinic pregnancy is a pregnancy that is established 
by the presence of a fetal sac on ultrasound, the presence of a fetal pole, and a 
heartbeat.  Once the heartbeat is detected at or around six to eight weeks 
gestation, the risk of spontaneous abortion diminishes significantly.  Id. at 50–51. 
  Indeed, blastocyst transfers are now 
 83. Jones & Veeck, supra note 33, at 659. 
 84. Id.; see also Kiessling, supra note 27, at 1088–89; Crockin, What is an 
Embryo?, supra note 27, at 1178–79 n.6. 
 85. SWIRE FALKER, supra note 82, at 224–26. 
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a common means of reducing the risk of high order multiple 
pregnancies in the IVF patient, as physicians are able to select only 
one or two blastocysts for embryo transfer.86  The second significant 
demarcation occurs at or around six weeks of embryonic 
development, when a heartbeat may be detected on ultrasound.  
The establishment of a heartbeat distinguishes a “chemical” 
pregnancy from a “clinical” pregnancy and with it a significantly 
reduced chance of miscarriage.87  The preembryo, whether frozen 
at blastocyst stage or earlier, or transferred to the mother’s uterus 
instead of being frozen, is not guaranteed to result in the detection 
of a pregnancy or a live birth.88  Many preembryos that are 
transferred to the mother’s uterus on either day three post-
fertilization or as a blastocyst do not implant in the uterine wall 
thus resulting in a negative pregnancy test, or implant in the 
uterine wall but, for any number of reasons from chromosomal 
abnormalities to uterine environmental issues, do not continue to 
grow to the fetal stage or result in a live birth.89
Just as scientists failed to develop a clear terminology for the 
development of the human embryo,
 
The frozen embryo that is the subject of the instant discussion 
and has not yet developed a primitive streak, may also not have 
achieved blastocyst development (although many preembryos are 
now being frozen at the blastocyst stage of development), and  
most certainly has not developed to a point where cellular 
individuation can be determined and pregnancy diagnosed with 
any degree of reliability.  Thus, frozen embryos that may be 
available for transfer and are the subject of this article arguably fall 
within the scientific definition of a preembryo. 
90 judges and state legislatures 
have also struggled with the definition of an embryo.  During the 
1970s and following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Roe 
v.Wade,91 several states enacted statutes which sought to prevent 
tampering or experimentation on a fetus.92
 
 86. Id. at 146, 226. 
 87. Id. at 50. 
  Many of these statutes 
used the terms “embryo” and “fetus” interchangeably whether it 
 88. Kiessling, supra note 27, at 1061–62. 
 89. Id. at 1058–62, 1087–89; Jones & Veeck, supra note 33, at 659. 
 90. Kiessling, supra note 27, at 1088–89. 
 91. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 92. See Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 603–04; see also MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (West 2003). 
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was in context of fetal homicide or scientific research.93  Louisiana 
defines an embryo as a juridical person who may be available for 
adoptive implantation and has all the rights afforded persons in 
Louisiana.94  Of those states which have embryo donation statutes, 
the term embryo is often used without a clear statutory definition, 
thus furthering confusion.95  Florida is the only state to use a 
definition most clearly aligned with the scientific analysis presented 
herein, using the term “preembryo” and defining it as the product 
of an egg fertilized by a sperm prior to the appearance of the 
“embryonic axis.”96
Case law further muddies the waters by providing numerous 
and conflicting analyses of the status of frozen embryos and the 
protections to which they are entitled, dependent largely on the 
jurisdiction and issue presented.  Most instructive are the cases 
involving disputes between divorcing progenitors regarding the 
disposition of their frozen embryos.  In one of two seminal cases 
involving the disposition of frozen embryos during a divorce, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis
 
97 sought to resolve 
conflicting requests between progenitors regarding their frozen 
embryos.  The wife sought to have the embryos transferred to her 
uterus in a post-divorce effort to conceive a child, while the 
husband objected and sought to have the frozen embryos remain 
in storage until such time as he determined whether he wanted to 
parent a child outside of their marriage.98
 
 93. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18–4016 (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 § 
12J (West 2003) (“[F]or purposes of this section, the word ‘fetus’ shall include also 
an embryo or neonate.”). 
 94. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121, -123 (2008).  Indeed, it is arguable that 
Louisiana’s definition of an embryo is unconstitutional insofar as it denies a 
pregnant woman the procreational freedom granted in Roe.  This statute is further 
objectionable in that a physician could arguably be subject to fetal homicide 
charges if she or he inadvertently thaws and allows an embryo to die prior to 
transfer to a uterus.  See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tenn. 1992) 
(discussing lower court’s ruling that would have afforded preembryos “the legal 
status of persons and vested them with legally cognizable interests separate from 
those of their progenitors.”). 
  While noting that Roe v. 
Wade does not recognize embryos to be persons within the meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court in Davis held that 
embryos are entitled to some interim, or “special protection” due 
 95. Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 603–04. 
 96. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.13–14 (West 2005); accord Crockin, The Embryo 
Wars, supra note 12, at 604. 
 97. 842 S.W.2d at 589. 
 98. Id. 
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss2/1
  
2009] THE DISPOSITION OF CRYOPRESERVED EMBRYOS 507 
to their potential for creating human life.99  Noting that the couple 
had not executed any written agreements regarding the disposition 
of any cryopreserved embryos with their infertility clinic and that 
Tennessee lacked any statute governing such disposition,100 the 
Davis court undertook a thorough review of both case law and 
scientific literature.  Further noting that the issue presented was a 
matter of first impression,101 the court looked to extensive 
commentary in legal and medical journals.102  Rejecting a property 
analysis, the Davis court applied a balancing test which weighed the 
interests of each of the parties, taking into consideration their 
procreative rights.103  While also noting that embryos cannot be 
considered persons under Tennessee law,104 the court concluded—
based largely on the scientific opinion of one expert and an ethics 
opinion from the American Fertility Society (now known as the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine)—that embryos are 
neither person nor property but rather “occupy an interim 
category that entitles them to special respect because of their 
potential for human life.”105
In contrast, the New York State Court of Appeals case Kass v. 
Kass,
 
106 which is factually similar to Davis, involved a dispute over 
cryopreserved embryos during a divorce.  In that case, Chief Justice 
Kaye enforced a divorcing couple’s prior written agreement to 
donate any frozen embryos to scientific research in the event they 
divorced, as set forth in consent documents they executed with 
their fertility clinic prior to undergoing in vitro fertilization 
(IVF).107  This was decided over the objections of the mother who 
wanted to use the frozen embryos for conception and the father’s 
objections to being forced into unwanted parenthood.108
 
 99. Id. at 596. 
 100. Id. at 590. 
 101. Id. at 589. 
 102. Id. at 590–91. 
 103. Id. at 603–04. 
 104. Id. at 594–95. 
  The court 
 105. Id. at 597; see also A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000) 
(following Davis and upholding in divorce dispute one parent's right not to 
procreate using cryopreserved embryos over competing claim from other genetic 
parent); Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo Donation, supra note 20, at 188 ("[I]n A.Z. 
v. B.Z., a Massachusetts court agreed with the Davis analysis, at least with respect to 
the classification of cryopreserved embryos in an interim category between 
personhood and property, ruling that embryos are deserving of special respect."). 
 106. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998). 
 107. Id at 175. 
 108. Id. 
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expressed a “need for clear, consistent principles to guide parties in 
protecting their interests and resolving their disputes, and the need 
for particular care in fashioning such principles as issues are better 
defined and appreciated.”109  The court next considered whether 
the procreational rights of either party or any protected interest of 
the frozen embryo would override the consent documents signed 
by the parties at the IVF clinic.110  Citing Roe v. Wade,111 the court 
noted that disposition of these frozen embryos neither implicated 
issues of privacy or bodily integrity in the area of reproductive 
freedom, nor were the “pre-zygotes recognized as ‘persons’ for 
constitutional purposes.”112  Thus, the court held that the relevant 
inquiry turned on who had dispositional authority over the frozen 
embryos, which was clearly articulated in the parties’ agreement 
signed at the time they entered into the IVF process at their fertility 
clinic.113  The court thus specifically declined to decide whether 
embryos are entitled to “special respect” as set forth in Davis.114  
Instead, the embryos were donated to science in accordance with 
the consent documents the parties’ signed with the IVF clinic.115
Other cases are informative although far less instructive as to 
whether cryopreserved embryos are considered persons or property 
under the law, or afforded some interim status as articulated in 
Davis.  In York v. Jones,
  
Although not expressly stated in Kass, the court arguably followed a 
property analysis in determining how the parties intended to 
dispose of their cryopreserved embryos. 
116 the court attempted to resolve a dispute 
between a couple undergoing IVF at a clinic in Virginia regarding 
who possessed control over cryopreserved embryos.  When the 
couple moved to California, they sought to have their frozen 
embryos transferred to a local fertility clinic for use in an embryo 
transfer procedure.117
 
 109. Id. at 179. 
 110. Id. 
 111. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  The court also cited Bryn v. New York City Health & 
Hosp. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887, 890 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1972). 
 112. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 179. 
 113. Id.  “The central issue is whether the consents clearly express the parties’ 
intent regarding disposition of the pre-zygotes in the present circumstances.”  Id. 
at 180. 
 114. Id. at 179. 
 115. The court concluded that the parties intended to donate the embryos for 
research purposes.  Id. at 182. 
 116. 717 F.Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
 117. Id. at 424–25. 
  The clinic in Virginia refused to release the 
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embryos.118  Relying on theories of property and bailment, the 
court held in favor of the parents.119  Without analyzing or 
considering the definition of a frozen embryo or what protected 
interests it may have, the court assumed that the embryos were the 
couple’s property and ordered their release to the California 
clinic.120  Consistent with the decision in York, the court in Hecht v. 
Superior Court121 held that sperm was property within the meaning of 
the California probate code noting, however, that its value lies in its 
potential to create a child after fertilization, growth, and birth.122
Additionally, in In re Marriage of Witten, the Iowa Supreme 
Court found that embryos are not children and therefore the best 
interest of the child standard did not apply to embryos.
 
123  In Jeter v. 
Mayo Clinic Arizona,124 the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed a 
lower court’s decision that a cryopreserved, three-day-old, eight-
celled “pre-embryo” was not a “person” for purposes of recovery 
under Arizona’s wrongful death statute.125
Thus, depending on the jurisdiction and the interest or issue 
presented, embryos may be considered property
 
126 or have no 
constitutionally protected interests.127  The interim standard of 
affording frozen embryos “special respect,” however, has been 
applied in Massachusetts, where the court in A.Z. v. B.Z128 applied 
the interim standard and avoided having to address two 
inconsistent, and arguably inapplicable, areas of the law: child 
custody and personal property.129
 
 118. Id. at 424. 
 119. Id. at 425, 427.  The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and 
ruled that the plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief may be granted.  Id. at 
427. 
 120. Id. at 424–25. 
 121. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 122. Id. at 283 (discussing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992)). 
 123. 672 N.W.2d 768, 775 (Iowa 2003). 
 124. 121 P.3d 1256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
 125. Id. at 1259, 1261; see also Miller v. Am. Infertility Group of Ill., No. 1-05-
3202, 2008 WL 4722566 (Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 24, 2008) (holding that although the 
Illinois Wrongful Death Act provides recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus, a 
blastocyst or embryo created through in vitro fertilization does not fall within the 
purview of that act). 
 126. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275; 
York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
 127. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Jeter, 121 P.3d at 1256; Witten, 672 
N.W.2d at 768; Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 174. 
 128. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000). 
  In addition, several 
 129. See Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo Donation, supra note 20, at 188 (“[I]n 
A.Z. v. B.Z., a Massachusetts court agreed with the Davis analysis, at least with 
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commentators have noted that the interim standard set forth in 
Davis and followed in A.Z. v. B.Z. will “insulate abortion rights from 
legal attack on the basis that embryos are persons.”130
From a statutory standpoint, while some states such as 
Louisiana have codified the definition of an embryo to mean a 
juridical person,
 
131 other states have expressed that embryos are 
property132 and recognize the recipient/intended parents as the 
legal and natural parents of the child conceived from the embryo 
donation.133  The Uniform Parentage Act134 and the American Bar 
Association’s Proposed Model Act on Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies both define an embryo as property subject to the 
disposition by its progenitors.135  The American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine further supports this view.136
It is clear that embryos are not persons within any 
interpretation of the law save isolated state statutes that are 
arguably subject to substantial constitutional challenge.
 
137
Embryos are comprised of living cellular matter, but absent the 
existence of a primitive streak and the successful implantation of 
the embryo in the uterus and/or the presence of a heartbeat, there 
  
Moreover, given the fact that most cryopreserved embryos will not 
ultimately give rise to life—indeed the special respect standard is 
based on the presumption of the possibility of life—and given that 
the cryopreserved embryo has yet to clearly distinguish or 
individuate into something more closely resembling life, assigning 
special respect to frozen embryos may ultimately undermine efforts 
to utilize these embryos for family building with non-genetically 
related parents and undermine constitutional notions of 
personhood. 
 
respect to the classification of cryopreserved embryos in an interim category 
between personhood and property.”). 
 130. E.g., id. at 189. 
 131. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121, 9:123 (2008). 
 132. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 554–55 (2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.  
§§ 160.702–.707 (2002). 
 133. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 554–55 (2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.  
§§ 160.702–.707 (2002). 
 134. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2000), 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001). 
 135. E.g., id.; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, § 603; http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/ 
ART_MOD_050506Draft.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2008). 
 136. Batsedis, supra note 32, at 567. 
 137. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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is no possibility for the embryo to have life.138  It has been noted, 
“[i]mplantation and the development of an embryonic disc is a 
more accurate requirement for [defining] embryo status.”139
IV. EMBRYO ADOPTION, PARENTAL AND PROCREATIVE RIGHTS. 
  The 
danger inherent in assigning qualities of personhood, even special 
respect, based on an incalculable likelihood that a given 
cryopreserved embryo will result in a live birth, when weighed 
against the well established procreative freedoms of both men and 
women and the constitutional right not to procreate, militates 
against defining an embryo as anything other than property. 
Importantly, while the definition and status of an embryo 
cannot be ignored as part of the discussion regarding the 
appropriate disposition of cryopreserved embryos to third parties, 
one cannot overlook the significant inherent conflict presented by 
the traditional adoption model and issues regarding the 
termination of parental rights.  Forty-nine of the fifty United States 
do not permit a biological mother (typically a pregnant birth 
mother) to terminate her parental rights until after the birth of the 
child.140  Although state laws vary more widely, birth fathers are 
similarly and routinely afforded a legal right to parent their 
children.141
 
 138. See supra notes 
  Thus, adoption law cannot and should not be applied 
72–89 and accompanying text. 
 139. Kiessling, supra note 27, at 1089. 
 140. Compare ALA. CODE § 26-10A-13 (2008) (permitting pre-birth termination 
of parental rights), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-107 (West 2008) (“[A] consent 
given before seventy-two hours after the birth of the child is invalid.”).  Most state 
statutes are predicated upon concerns that a pre-birth consent to relinquish 
parental rights cannot constitute a meaningful, or knowing consent to place a 
child for adoption and terminate parental rights to that child.  See N.Y. DOM. REL. 
LAW § 115-b (McKinney 2008); Matter of Guilio De Filippis v. Kirchner 217 
N.Y.S.2d 145 (N.Y.App. Div. 1995) (finding that “a pre-birth consent was invalid as 
it was inconsistent with the legislative objectives of protecting the natural parent 
from improvidence or overreaching and insuring that a consent is a product of a 
fully deliberate act.”) (citing People ex rel. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 139 
N.Y.S.2d 189 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Adoption of Female Infant B v. Khatuna B., 51 
N.Y.S.3d 419 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (“[F]urthermore, as in De Filippis, the 
surrender agreement here was executed after the birth of the child, when 
respondent had sufficient opportunity to reflect on whether she wished to cede 
her parental rights.  As was noted in De Filippis, a pre-birth consent is less likely to 
be the result of a fully deliberate act.”). 
 141. The difference between the termination standards for birth mothers and 
birth fathers turns on the timing and requirements of notice and/or consent to 
the adoption.  Compare Robert O. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 100 (N.Y. 1992) 
(holding that an unwed father who was unaware of the pregnancy or birth of his 
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to the disposition of embryos to third parties for purposes of family 
building simply because forty-nine state statutes invalidate any pre-
birth consent to terminate their parental rights.142  Moreover, 
because embryos are clearly not considered to be children under 
any cognizable theory,143 it is wholly inapposite to rely on adoption 
statutes that apply to the placement of children.144
Further complicating the application of adoption laws to the 
disposition of frozen embryos to third parties are historical 
presumptions (codified in most states) which recognize the woman 
who gave birth to the child and her husband, if married at the time 
of birth, to be the legal and natural father of the child.
 
145  Indeed, 
this presumption has been expanded to include cases in which the 
birth mother did not bear a genetic link to the child to whom she 
gave birth146 and is reflected in recent changes to statutory 
language regarding the presumption of parentage.147
 
child until eighteen months after the child’s birth was neither entitled to notice, 
nor was his consent to the adoption required where he failed to take any steps to 
discover the pregnancy or the birth of the child), and In re Cassidy YY, 802 
N.Y.S.2d 520, 521–22 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (“[I]nasmuch as an unwed father must 
act promptly to assert his parental rights, we affirm.  Petitioner failed to manifest a 
willingness to be a parent at any time during the period from conception . . . until 
. . . after the adoption. . . .  [P]etitioner does not allege that the mother actively 
concealed her pregnancy from him, and he . . . made no effort to contact the 
mother following their months of sexual intercourse to inquire as to the possibility 
that their relationship had resulted in a child.”), and In re Baby Girl U, 638 
N.Y.S.2d 253, 255 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“[E]ven if we were to accept respondent’s 
contention that his failure to act was due to the actions of the mother, and he was 
therefore excused from satisfying the six-month time requirement, we find that 
Family Court correctly concluded that respondent failed to engage in any conduct 
indicative of a manifestation of parental responsibility.”), with 23 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§§ 2511, 2513, 2711, 2714 (2008) (stating that a birth father must be notified of a 
pending adoption and his consent is unnecessary only if his parental rights have 
been previously terminated). 
  Thus, 
applying traditional principles of state adoption law—which 
require the post-birth consent to the adoption and post-birth 
termination of parental rights—has the potential to create even 
 142. Kindregan & McBrien, Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra note 13. 
 143. See supra Part I. 
 144. See id. 
 145. E.g., Kindregan & McBrien, Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra note 13. 
 146. McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 479–80 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) 
(holding the mother who conceived via egg donation to be legal and natural 
mother of the children conceived, even though she did not provide the eggs) 
(citing Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993)). 
 147. Id.; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney Supp. 2008) (changing the word 
“natural” child to “birth” child); Id. § 24 (substituting “birth parents” for “natural 
parents”). 
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greater instability and risk than exists in a traditional domestic 
adoption.  While all adoptive parents assume some risk that the 
birth parents may choose to parent the child they conceived, there 
are clearly defined statutory limits on the right of a birth parent to 
revoke consent to an adoption. 
For example, in a New York private-placement adoption, a 
birth mother who executes an Extra Judicial Consent to the 
adoption of her baby has forty-five days in which to revoke that 
consent.148  This is based on a “common-law presumption favoring 
the biological parents’ rights to custody . . . .”149  New York further 
recognizes that the woman who gave birth to a child and her 
husband are the legal and natural parents of any child born during 
their marriage regardless of whether they are genetically related to 
that child.150
Using New York law as an example, applying its parental 
termination laws and its presumption of maternity and paternity
  These two presumptions, whether legislative or based 
on common law, are becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile, 
especially in the context of an embryo adoption. 
151 
to an embryo “adoption” might result in the legal nightmare of 
having, at the time of the child’s birth, four legally recognized 
parents of the once cryogenically preserved embryo.  That is, the 
recipient or intended parents who successfully gestated and 
delivered the newborn, if married at the time of birth, will be 
presumed to be the legal and natural parents of the child under 
New York law.152  Simultaneously, the genetic parents (who in a 
conventional adoption scenario stand in the shoes of the birth 
mother and father), have not yet been able to statutorily terminate 
their parental rights and have the benefit of a well established 
presumption in favor of retaining custody of their biological 
child.153
 
 148. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b. 
 149. People ex rel. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 530 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1988). 
 150. E.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (as amended July 21, 2008) (“[A]ny child 
born to a married woman by means of artificial insemination . . . shall be deemed 
the legitimate birth child of the husband and his wife for all purposes.”); 
McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 480 (holding gestational mother who gave birth from 
donated eggs was the natural mother of her children). 
 151. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 24, 73 (see commentary to section 73 by Alan D. 
Schienkman, recognizing the strong common law presumption of legitimacy of 
children born to a married woman). 
 152. Id. § 24 
  If that newborn were to have a life-threatening illness 
 153. See, e.g., Kindregan, supra note 14, at 50; see People ex rel. Anonymous v. 
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there are potentially four legally recognized “parents” who have 
decision-making power regarding that newborn’s medical care. 
Equally frightening is the prospect that when applying the 
traditional adoption model, under New York Law the 
recipient/intended parents could carry the pregnancy to term and 
deliver the child, only to face the genetic parents’ sudden change 
of heart, assertion of their genetic link, and a lack of termination of 
their parental rights, creating a contested adoption.154
Although analogous to a surrogacy dispute, it is unclear 
whether existing case law which has been applied in surrogacy 
contests and which looks to the parties’ intent
 
Thus, the application of adoption law is not only inapposite 
but creates a complicated legal quagmire of potential issues for a 
court to resolve in the inevitable instance in which an embryo 
adoption is contested. 
155 at the time the 
surrogacy was entered into in order to establish parentage will be 
sufficiently persuasive enough to override decades of public policy 
seeking to preserve the parental rights of birth parents.156  Indeed, 
following either of the fact patterns presented above and applying 
New York law, both sets of parents likely would be afforded some 
form of protected legal rights as parents to the child conceived 
from the embryo adoption.  In Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, the Appellate 
Division of the New York Supreme Court was forced to address 
competing claims for parentage that resulted from the mis-
implantation of embryos created during IVF.157
In the spring of 1998, plaintiffs Deborah Perry-Rogers and her 





Anonymous, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 615 (discussing historical presumption in favor of 
birth parents).  
 154. Compare N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 with N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b. 
 155. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998); In re Marriage of Witten, 
672 N.W.2d 768, 777 (Iowa 2003). 
 156. See, e.g., Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19, 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); 
Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (adhering to 
the California Supreme Court’s determination that there can be only one natural 
mother to a child); see also People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption 
Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185 (1971), cert. denied sub nom, DeMartino v. Scarpetta, 404 US 
805 (1971)). 
 157. 715 N.Y.S.2d at 21. 
 158. Id. 
  At the same time, defendants Donna and Richard Fasano 
were also undergoing IVF treatment at the same clinic.  
Unbeknownst to both parties, when transferring the Fasano’s 
26
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embryos into Donna Fasano’s uterus, the IVF clinic inadvertently 
included embryos belonging to the Perry-Rogerses.159  Shortly 
thereafter the clinic notified both couples of the mistake and 
advised them to undergo genetic and amniocentesis testing.160  
Upon learning of the mix-up, the Perry-Rogerses immediately 
attempted to contact the Fasanos.161
The following December, Donna Fasano delivered two healthy 
baby boys of different races.
 
162  One baby, who was Caucasian, was 
determined to be the genetic child of the Fasanos.163  The other 
boy, Akiel, who was African-American, was subsequently 
determined to be the genetic child of the Perry-Rogerses.164  The 
Fasanos took no action regarding the apparent error nor did they 
respond to the Perry-Rogers’ attempts at contact until the Perry-
Rogerses commenced a lawsuit against them and the fertility 
clinic.165  The Perry-Rogerses alleged, inter alia, medical malpractice 
against the clinic and sought a declaratory judgment regarding the 
parties’ rights, obligations, and genetic relationship with respect to 
Akiel.166  The Perry-Rogerses sought full custody of Akiel based on 
the fact that the Fasanos were “genetic strangers” to him.167  The 
Fasanos sought visitation based on a prior agreement between the 
parties.168
[O]n this issue we will not simply adopt the Rogerses’ 
suggestion that no gestational mother may ever claim 
visitation with the infant she carried in view of her status a 
“genetic stranger” to the infant.  In recognition of current 
reproductive technology, the term “genetic stranger” 
alone can no longer be enough to end a discussion of this 
issue.  Additional consideration may be relevant for an 
initial threshold analysis of who is, or may be, a 
 
In reversing the initial award of custody to the Fasanos and 
directing further proceedings to establish the Perry-Rogeres’ legal 
parentage of Akiel, the Appellate Division noted: 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 21–22. 
 162. Id. at 22. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 22–23. 
 168. Id. at 22. 
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“parent.”169
Noting that the laws of the State of New York traditionally 
distinguish “natural parents” from adoptive, step, or foster parents, 
the court reasoned that advances in reproductive technologies 
created new legal issues revolving around the definition of the term 
“mother.”
 
170  The court thus undertook a brief survey of cases with 
similar or instructive fact patterns.171
The Perry-Rogers court first discussed the seminal California 
case of Johnson v. Calvert,
 
172 in which a gestational carrier refused to 
relinquish custody of a child she carried for another couple and to 
whom she had no genetic connection.173  The California Supreme 
Court in Johnson relied on the parties’ intent as expressed in a 
surrogacy contract and awarded custody of the child to its genetic 
parents.174  The Johnson court noted that in defining the term 
“mother,” “when the two means do not coincide in one woman, she 
who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who intended to 
bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her 
own—is the natural mother under California law.”175
The Perry-Rogers court next turned its attention to a 1994 New 
York case, McDonald v. McDonald,
 
176 involving a divorce dispute 
regarding the custody of children conceived during the course of 
the marriage and through the assistance of an egg donor.177  The 
McDonald court applied the intent analysis set forth in Johnson and 
found the mother to be the legal and natural mother, rejecting the 
father’s position that only a genetic parent and natural parent has a 
superior claim to custody.178
[I]t is apparent . . . that a “gestational mother” may 
possess enforceable rights under the law, despite her 
being a “genetic stranger” to the child.  Given the 
complex possibilities in these kind of circumstances, it is 
 
Thus, the court in Perry-Rogers noted that under an intent 
analysis: 
 
 169. Id. at 23 (citation omitted). 
 170. Id. at 23–24. 
 171. Id. at 24. 
 172. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (cited in Perry-Rogers, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 24). 
 173. Id. at 778. 
 174. Id. at 782. 
 175. Id. 
 176. 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (cited in Perry-Rogers, 715 N.Y.S.2d 
at 24). 
 177. Id. at 478. 
 178. Id. at 480. 
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simply inappropriate to render any determination solely 
as a consequence of genetics. . . . . [I]t is worth noting that 
even if the Fasanos had claimed the right to custody of the 
child, application of the “intent” analysis . . . would—in 
our view—require that custody be awarded to the 
Rogerses.  It was they who purposefully arranged for their 
genetic material to be taken and used in order to attempt 
to create their own child, whom they intended to rear.179
The court, however, noted in dicta that there might be 
circumstances in which both a genetic mother and a gestational 
mother would have competing interests in being declared parents, 




It is thus clear, following established case law which attempts to 
resolve competing claims of parentage and conflicting and 
inconsistent state statutes, that there is no clear resolution to the 
issue of what will happen in the inevitable event that an embryo 
adoption is contested.  Indeed, application of the intent analysis set 
forth above may be inappropriate in an embryo adoption.  Two 
commentators have each posited two perhaps seemingly 
contradictory reasons why the intent theory for resolving embryo 
adoption disputes is unworkable.  One commentator, Jessica 
Lambert, has noted that it is not an appropriate legal analysis, 
“because ‘adopting’ a[n] . . . embryo is unlikely to be seen as the 





 179. Perry-Rogers, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 24. 
 180. Id. at 25 n.1 (discussing possibility for both parties in a lesbian couple to 
be declared the child’s mother, where a biological parent might be entitled to 
visitation notwithstanding having placed child for adoption, and finding Fasano’s 
nominal parental relationship over Akiel should have been corrected before the 
development of a parental relationship with him).  The facts presented bore more 
similarity to cases involving a mix-up of newborn infants in a hospital nursery, 
which the court noted should be corrected immediately, as compared to one in 
which a “gestational mother has arguably the same rights to claim parentage as the 
genetic mother.  Under such circumstances, the Fasanos will not be heard to claim 
the status of parents . . . .”  Id. at 25. 
  Another commentator, Charles Kindregan, has aptly 
pointed out that it is difficult to apply the intent standard when 
 181. Lambert, supra note 20, at 569 (noting in contrast to a surrogacy dispute 
that in the “embryo donation context the recipient couple has neither 
orchestrated the creation of the embryo nor initiated the implantation of it.”  
There is thus more difficulty applying the same “reasoning of intended 
parenthood to impose legal parental rights (and the resulting burdens of 
unwanted parenthood that are the focus of the balancing test) in the embryo 
donation context . . . .”). 
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each party to an embryo adoption at some point sought to become 
a parent.182
[W]hen frozen embryos are bestowed with the rights of 
personhood it effectively confers upon them more rights 
than developing fetuses.  Given the political and legal 
ramifications of affording an embryo rights that would 
provide a corresponding limitation on procreative liberty 
of the potential parents . . . [it] would be ill-advised to 
adopt a “best interests” standard for cases regarding 
disputes over embryos.
 
Of additional concern would be the possibility that a court 
might apply the best interests standard normally utilized to resolve 
contested adoptions.  As at least one commentator has pointed out: 
183
It is thus clear that the adoption paradigm for disposition of 
cryopreserved embryos to third parties is inapposite for numerous 
reasons.  Traditional adoption laws pertaining to the 
relinquishment of parental rights simply cannot be applied in a 
pre-birth context.  Furthermore, public policies favoring 
recognition of the parent who gives birth as the legal parent, in 
contrast to the relinquishment standard, clearly places the parties 
to an embryo adoption at odds.  Both have recognizable rights that 
potentially come into play in a contested embryo adoption.  If the 
contested embryo adoption were to take place pre-birth when 
parentage issues are even murkier, traditional notions regarding 
the protection of children—a category to which embryos cannot be 
assigned—may require the application of the “best interests” 
standard to protect the embryo.  This is even more likely to happen 
in a jurisdiction that favors the “special respect” standard 
established in Davis.  Providing rights of personhood to the embryo 
in a contested adoption directly pits the embryo against the 
procreative rights of all four potential parents.  “Simply calling 
embryo donation ‘embryo adoption’ does not, and cannot, make it 
fit within those legal constructs, and legal commentators, 
consumers, and ethicists have all questioned the apparent bias and 





 182. Kindregan, Collaborative Reproduction, supra note 
 
 
13, at 53. 
 183. Lambert, supra note 20, at 556–57. 
 184. Crockin, “What is an Embryo?”, supra note 27, at 1184. 
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V. EMBRYO DONATION BY CONTRACT AND STATUTE: THE ONLY 
WORKABLE SOLUTION 
It is evident that the misuse of terminology has created larger 
issues than the actual application of the adoption paradigm to the 
disposition of cryopreserved embryos to third parties for purposes 
of conception.  Whether this is an intentional effort to buttress pro-
life arguments and undermine procreative autonomy established in 
Roe v. Wade,185 or simply due to confusion186 or a lack of awareness 
of the complexities of the issues presented,187
The very advantages sought to be achieved through the use of 
frozen embryos for family building by third parties—an affordable 
means of building a family, control over the pregnancy, the ability 
to experience pregnancy and childbirth, together with the 
potential finality of the process with no concerns about a birth 
parent coming back and asserting parental rights—initially made 
embryo donation an exciting opportunity for infertile families.
 it is critical that the 
legal and scientific communities resolve these issues. 
188  
These goals are all undermined by the application of principles of 
adoption.  Indeed, the requirement that an infertile couple 
undergo a home study (a mechanism usually utilized by the state to 
protect the best interests of a child—a category this article has 
previously determined is inapplicable to frozen embryos), child 
abuse clearances, and background checks is not only burdensome 
but also sets apart the recipient parent from other infertile patients 
undergoing third party assisted reproduction.  There is no logical 
reason to require the recipient of a frozen embryo to jump over 
additional hurdles that individuals who are building their families 
through egg and sperm donation are not required to undertake.189
 
 185. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 
  
12, at 611, 
623; Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo Donation, supra note 20, at 188. 
 186. See Lambert, supra note 20, at 550–51 (discussing confusion in 
terminology that may affect a court’s determination of parental rights and 
responsibilities). 
 187. See Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo Donation, supra note 20, at 176 (noting 
that physicians have been transferring embryos between consenting parties 
without concern for legal considerations). 
 188. See Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 616–17; see also Nightlite 
Christian Adoptions, supra note 66. 
 189. The author in no way means to assert that psychological counseling is not 
appropriate.  Indeed, it is the author’s belief that the psychological counseling 
offered to recipients of other types of third party assisted reproduction serves to 
protect the same interests, education, awareness, and resolution of grief regarding 
the underlying infertility is entirely appropriate to any person choosing third party 
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Moreover, requiring recipient families to participate in an 
unnecessary and burdensome process in order to participate in a 
form of assisted reproduction, which has a low success rate, instead 
serves to promote two undesirable goals.  First, it drives up the cost 
of what is otherwise one of the more affordable forms of third party 
assisted reproduction.  Second, it sets up the recipient or intended 
parent for severe disappointment.  By establishing presumptions 
and creating discussions regarding the inevitability of 
parenthood—as is the normal dialogue in an adoption home 
study—the recipient/intended parent may begin to assume that 
the frozen embryo transfer will result in a pregnancy when statistics 
do not bear out that probability.190
Although there are some 400,000 cryopreserved embryos is the 
United States,
 
191 due to regulations governing the donation of 
human tissue promulgated by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration,192 it has been estimated that only 2% (or eight 
thousand) of those frozen embryos are realistically available for 
donation or adoption for purposes of a third party’s family 
building.193  The likelihood that any given recipient of an embryo 
donation/adoption will conceive is much lower than with a 
standard fresh (non-frozen) transfer of embryos.194  While success 
rates for fresh IVF transfers consistently approach 50%, the average 
live birth rate for frozen embryo transfers is approximately 30%.195  
Indeed, the limited number of frozen embryos actually available for 
transfer to recipient parents,196
 
assisted reproduction. 
 combined with the lower success 
 190. See Angela Woodall, Embryo “Adoption” Program Gives Hope to Infertile 
Couples, OAKLAND TRIB. Dec. 26, 2004 (“[T]hey must understand not all the 
embryos turn into babies.”) (quoting Arthur Caplan, Chairman of the Department 
of Medical Ethics and Director of the Center for Bioethics, University of 
Pennsylvania)); Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 630 (noting that three 
out of four embryos are lost during the natural process of conception). 
 191. Hoffman et al., supra note 15, at 1068. 
 192. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.80, 1271.85, 1271.90 (2008). 
 193. Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 609. 
 194. According to 2006 statistics reported by the Centers for Disease Control, 
success rates for non-ovum donor fresh IVF cycles in women under 35 (based on 
national averages) is 44.9%, compared to success rates for frozen embryo cycles in 
the same group of patients of 33.1%.  SARTCORS ONLINE, CLINIC SUMMARY 
REPORT:  ALL SART MEMBER CLINICS, available at https://www.sartcors 
online.com/rptCSR_ PublicMultYrear.aspx?ClinicPKID+0 (last visited Dec. 31, 
2008) (on file with author). 
 195. Id. 
 196. According to one study, 71% of patients change their mind about 
donating their frozen embryos to third parties.  Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra 
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rates for this technology when compared to other forms of third 
party assisted reproduction like egg and sperm donation, has 
resulted in a limited number of facilities or organizations actually 
conducting embryo donation/adoptions in the United States.197
The cost for an embryo donation/adoption, however, is much 
lower than for any other form of assisted reproduction and 




It is clear, however, that the limited number of embryos 
available for donation/adoption has negatively impacted what was 
initially thought to be a potentially explosive new business.
  Indeed, should resolution of the legal 
ambiguities surrounding embryo adoption/donation be resolved, it 
may become a more popular means of family building for more 
people. 
199  
Frozen embryo banks and agencies routinely fail due to the limited 
supply of frozen embryos and the complexities presented by federal 
and state law.200  Although significantly promoted and endorsed by 
the Bush Administration, and despite federal funding,201 there are 
very few viable places to go if one is interested in participating in an 
embryo donation/adoption.  Very few infertility clinics report 
having active embryo donation/adoption programs, leaving the 
potential consumer/recipient parent to work with a select few 
embryo adoption agencies, privately through attorneys, or 
sometimes independently on the Internet.202
 
note 
  Of those agencies 
12, at 615 (citing Susan C. Klock et al., Correspondence, The Disposition of 
Unused Frozen Embryos, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 69 (2001)). 
 197. See Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 616 (“[I]n practice, the 
volume interest in this option never materialized for multiple, unanticipated 
reasons.”). 
 198. Id. 
 199. See id. at 616–17. 
 200. Indeed, the 2005 promulgation of FDA regulations, designed to ensure 
that embryos and other cellular-based matter created through the donation of 
human ova and/or sperm were free of infectious disease, resulted in making most, 
if not all, of the embryos created prior to effective date of the regulations 
ineligible for embryo donation/adoption.  That is, most embryos which were 
created from donor egg or sperm, or which will be donated themselves, did not 
undergo the intensive screening mandated by the FDA in order to make them 
eligible for donation.  See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.80 (2008). 
 201. The embryo adoption program Snowflakes is federally funded.  Crockin, 
The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 616, 623; see also Nightlite Christian Adoptions, 
supra note 66. 
 202. Elissa K. Zirinsky, Adoption’s New Frontier, CBS NEWS.COM, July 28, 2005, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/07/28/national/main712541.shtml?sourc
e=search story (discussing how one couple found an embryo donor on a message 
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conducting embryo donation/adoption there are only a handful 
with active programs, including The National Embryo Donation 
Center, Snowflakes (a division of Nightlight Christian Adoptions)203
In contrast to the difficulties embryo adoption/donation 
agencies are having in establishing a foothold in the world of 
reproductive technology and business, egg donation agencies 
abound.  This is due largely in part to the ease with which an egg 
donation may be implemented from a legal perspective.  Many 
state statutes present a workable model for absolving egg donors of 
parental rights.
 
and relative newcomers such as Adoptions From The Heart. 
204  Whether it is through a direct statute205 or 
reasoning by analogy based on a sperm donation statute,206 the 
termination of parental rights of an egg donor is easily undertaken 
through contract and with statutory support.  Similarly, gestational 
carrier agreements, when supported by statutes, readily protect the 
parental interests of the recipient/intended parents to the baby 
carried by a third party.207
 
board posted on www.ivfconnections.com); Liza Mundy, Out of The Freezer, Into the 
Family: The Booming, and Bizarre, Business of Embryo Adoption, SLATE, May 31, 2005, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2119845/ (discussing matching recipient and donating 
families on a Yahoo message board). 
  It is these models that are best utilized 
and adapted to embryo disposition to third parties if it is going to 
become a popular means of family building.  Agencies and clinics 
that are reluctant to step into this business likely are reluctant to do 
so because of the lack of guidance from the law and the ambiguity 
regarding the definition of the embryo. 
 203. See, e.g., Batsedis, supra note 32, at 569; see also Crockin, The Embryo Wars, 
supra note 12, at 623–24 (discussing federal funding of Snowflakes by Bush 
Adminsitration). 
 204. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-775 (Supp. 2008) (“[A]n identified or 
anonymous donor of sperm or eggs used in [artificial insemination with donor 
sperm or eggs], or any person claiming by or through such donor, shall not have 
any right or interest in any child born as a result of [artificial insemination with 
donor sperm or eggs].”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-102(8) (Supp. 2006) (‘Donor’ 
means an individual who produces eggs or sperm used for assisted reproduction, 
whether or not for consideration.  The term does not include: (i) A husband who 
provides sperm, or a wife who provides eggs, to be used for assisted reproduction 
by the wife; (ii) A woman who gives birth to a child by means of assisted 
reproduction, or (iii) a parent under subchapter VII of this chapter).  “A donor is 
not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”  Id. § 8-702 
(2004). 
 205. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-207. 
 206. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney Supp. 2008). 
 207. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.  47/1–75 (West Supp. 2008). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
It is incumbent upon legal practitioners and jurists to 
recognize the appropriate definition of an embryo, as cellular 
matter subject to disposition under a property or contract theory of 
law, and for state legislatures to provide coherent structures for the 
legal transfer of embryos to third parties along with parental rights 
to the recipient parents.  States such as Texas and Oklahoma, 
together with the Uniform Parentage Act and the American Bar 
Association’s Model Act on Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 
provide good examples of statutory frameworks that enable a 
workable structure for embryo donation. 
It is time to abandon outdated and inapposite terminology.  
Adoption is not an appropriate or justifiable paradigm for the 
disposition of frozen embryos for purposes of conception.  Rather, 
a consistent and meaningful standard can be found through the 
application of contract and property law together with clear 
guidance from legislatures.  Through the proper application of the 
law and consistent use of appropriate terminology, embryo 
donation can become more popular and provide an affordable and 
workable alternative for many socially and medically infertile 
people in the United States. 
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